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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the use of social welfare functions in
evaluating changes. In particular, it considers suggestions that welfare
weights to be used in comparing the gains and losses of diﬀerent indi-
viduals (or other appropriate units of analysis), and a social time pref-
erence rate for use in cost beneﬁt evaluation, can be estimated either
from consumers’ behaviour or from the judgements implicit in tax pol-
icy. It is suggested that results are highly sensitive to the context and
model speciﬁcation assumed. More importantly, the argument that an
estimated elasticity of marginal utility or time preference rate should
be used in policy evaluations fails to recognise that fundamental value
judgements are involved. Various estimates may be of interest, but
they cannot be used by economists to impose value judgements. The
main contribution economists can make is to examine the implications
of adopting a range of alternative value judgements.
∗I am grateful to Nisvan Erkal, Norman Gemmell, Ross Guest, Guyonne Kalb and
Denis O’Brien for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
11 Introduction
Any attempt to answer the question, ‘when is a change an improvement?’,
faces the fundamental diﬃc u l t yt h a ti tc a n n o ta v o i dt h eu s eo fv a l u ej u d g e -
ments. Hence complete agreement in any particular context — say the eﬀect
of a proposed change to a tax and transfer system — is most unlikely, even
if there are no losers.1 The approach adopted in economics is to specify ex-
plicit value judgements in a formal manner, using a social evaluation function
or, following Samuelson (1947), a ‘Social Welfare Function’. Crucially, this
function formally expresses the value judgements of a ﬁctional judge or policy
maker. It is not, despite the use of the term ‘social’, intended to represent
any kind of aggregate or representative views of society.2 I n d e e dt h ej u d g ei s
considered to be an independent person who is not aﬀected by the outcomes.
Social welfare functions are used in static contexts, involving a distrib-
ution over income units, and in dynamic contexts, involving a distribution
over time periods. In attaching ‘welfare weights’ to each unit or time pe-
riod, the concept of the elasticity of the marginal valuation of income (or
consumption, depending on the welfare metric adopted) plays an important
role. Many contributions to the literature appear to regard this elastic-
ity as something that can be objectively measured. For reviews of various
approaches to measuring or estimating this elasticity, see Pearce and Ulph
(1998), Cowell and Gardiner (1999) and Evans (2005).
The aim of the present paper is to review a number of frameworks in which
the elasticity of marginal valuation is central. Stress is placed on the need to
distinguish these contexts and models clearly, in order to avoid the possible
inappropriate ‘transfer’ of a value from one context to another. In particular,
it is argued that the central concept of the elasticity cannot be measured
objectively but involves value judgements. Hence the role of economists is
not to propose the use of particular values, which is equivalent to imposing
1The Pareto criterion has little practical use as it refuses to pass judgement where losers
exist, and is certainly not a value-free criterion. There are also well-known problems with
the use of ‘potential Pareto improvements’.
2The extreme case of a ‘representative agent’, mentioned below, is the exception where
the welfare function corresponds to the utility function of the ﬁctional representative.
2judgements, but to examine the implications of adopting alternative value
judgements. The view put forward here is in line with that of Robbins
(1935, p.148) when he argued, ‘between the generalisations of positive and
normative studies there is a logical gulf ﬁxed which no ingenuity can disguise
and no juxtaposition in space or time bridge over’. This contrast with those,
such as Evans (2005), who suggested that the UK Treasury recommendation
of a value for the elasticity of around unity, when forming distributional
welfare weights or computing a social time preference rate in cost-beneﬁt
studies, is too low. Similarly, Pearce and Ulph (1998, p. 282) argued that
the UK Treasury recommended discount rate at the time was too high. They
argued, ‘we ﬁnd it impossible to support the continued use of rates in the
region of 6% for the UK. Such rates are far too high’. In each of these
examples, the view was presented as a ﬁnding, rather than a value judgement.
First, section 2 brieﬂy introduces the form of social welfare function and
welfare weights widely adopted in the literature on policy evaluation. Some
simple properties of welfare functions are typically speciﬁed, with the hope
that while they cannot be expected to represent any kind of consensus, they
are at least likely to appeal to a large number of people. It is in this spirit that
the form of evaluation function widely adopted reﬂects adherence to value
judgements such as the ‘principle of transfers’ (whereby a transfer from a
richer to a poorer person is judged to produce an ‘improvement’3)a sw e l la s
being individualistic, additive and Paretean. The ﬁrst problem is to select
a welfare metric and a unit of analysis, with both choices involving value
judgements. An additive social welfare function is typically formed as an
appropriate weighted sum. Thus the problem is to specify precisely how
those weights, referred to as ‘welfare weights’, are formed.4
Section 3 examines the estimation of a value of the elasticity that is
t h o u g h tt ob ei m p l i c i ti na ni n c o m et a xs t r u c t u r e .A t t e m p t st oi m p u t es u c h
3This is conditional on the transfer being such that the transferee does not become
richer than the transferor.
4For ‘classical utilitarians’, the evaluation criterion was simply the sum, over all individ-
uals, of utilities. The welfare weights were thus all unity. However, substantial diﬀerences
of viewpoint exist concerning both the welfare metric to be used and the value judgement
that the distribution among individuals is irrelevant, such that only the aggregate matters.
3a value include Mera (1969), Stern (1977), Christiansen and Jansen (1978),
Moreh (1981), Brent (1984), Cowell and Gardiner (1999) and Evans (2005).
This approach, based on an assumption of equal absolute sacriﬁce as a policy
objective, necessarily produces for a progressive tax a value of the elasticity
of marginal valuation in excess of unity. Section 3 considers whether this
approach can actually provide reliable evidence of implicit judgements, or
could legitimately be used as the foundation of an argument in favour of
using those values. The sacriﬁce approach is contrasted in section 4 with a
standard optimal linear tax model. This gives progressive taxes with values
of the elasticity well below unity, demonstrating the sensitivity of any implied
value to the precise objective assumed on the part of policy makers and to
the model which is assumed to generate outcomes.
Section 5 brieﬂy gives some idea of the implications, in terms of value
judgements, of adopting alternative values of the elasticity. This involves the
idea, familiar from the literature on inequality measurement, of the ‘leaky
bucket’ experiment, which makes explicit the tolerance of losses when making
income transfers between individuals. The main conclusions are in section
6, where the fundamental diﬀerence between what ‘is’ and what ‘should’ be
is stressed. Given the need to make value judgements, economists have no
special qualiﬁcations or authority to impose their own judgements on others,
and cannot use ‘estimates’ as support for their views. Economists have an
obligation to make value judgements explicit, and their role is to examine
the implications of adopting a range of such judgements. Having been pre-
sented with alternative results, readers can then form their own opinions.
Ultimately, the paper aims to make clear some important distinctions which
are often confused in the literature.
2 Social Evaluations
As mentioned in section 1, a standard approach to the evaluation of a policy
or other change is to use a social welfare, or social evaluation, function. This
is often deﬁned as individualistic, additive and Paretean in form. This section
discusses the form of social welfare function commonly used in the evaluation
4literature and the associated elasticity of marginal valuation. First, single-
period comparisons are discussed, and this is followed by a brief examination
of the multi-period context.
2.1 Single-Period Comparisons
Deﬁne the contribution to social welfare of unit h as W (xh), where xh is some
measure relating to that unit. A prior decision must be made regarding the
unit of analysis: this important issue is not discussed here, and for simplic-
ity the unit is referred to below as the individual. The deﬁnition of x,the
‘welfare metric’, is problematic and usually depends on the context. It is var-
iously deﬁned as income, consumption, utility, or money metric utility, where
each concept may, in addition, be expressed in ‘adult equivalent’ terms, and
such equivalence scales themselves involve diﬃcult value judgements. Social





and any change, which may or may not be induced by a policy variable or
variables (such as an income tax structure or a set of indirect tax rates),







and letting vh =
∂W(xh)
∂xh denote the ‘marginal valuation’, the contribution to





The term vh represents the ‘welfare weight’ attached to the hth individual.
An aversion to inequality on the part of the ‘policy maker’ is speciﬁed by
an assumption that W (.) is concave, so that it satisﬁes the ‘principle of
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elasticity plays an important role in what follows. Importantly, the term
‘marginal valuation’ is used here rather than using ‘marginal utility’, since
W (x) is not a utility function. The function W (x) actually represents, as
mentioned above, the contribution to ‘social welfare’ (that is to the social
evaluation function) of the hth person, however x is deﬁned. In some contexts
(such as the optimal tax literature) x actually represents utility (or some
money metric measure of utility), and in the marginal indirect tax reform
literature it represents indirect utility.5





for εs 6=1 ,a n dW (x)=l o g x,w h e r eεs =1 . In this case, substitution in
(4) gives R = εs and εs thus reﬂects a constant degree of relative inequality
aversion of the judge or policy maker.
Importantly, εs is not an objective measure relating to individuals in so-
ciety, but reﬂects the subjective value judgements of a ﬁctional policy maker
who is evaluating the eﬀects of alternative policies or outcomes. There is
therefore no reason why a value of εs, to be imposed by economists in making
5In the literature on marginal tax reform, W is deﬁned in terms of (indirect) utilities,
Vh,s ot h a tW =
PH
h=1 W (Vh) and the eﬀect of a change in the price of good i, pi, say























In specifying the term in brackets, W is usually re-interpreted in terms of total expendi-
tures, with W (mh)=m
1−ε
h /(1 − ε) and so the term in brackets becomes m
−ε
h .
6comparisons, could be estimated using information from studies of household
budgets. This suggestion is sometimes made even though the demand stud-
ies use quite diﬀerent utility functions. For example, elasticities obtained
on the basis of the linear expenditure system (LES) are discussed by Evans
(2005, pp. 204-206). The use of the LES necessarily produces a value of
ε well above unity, since it can be interpreted as the ratio of total expendi-
ture to supernumerary expenditure, that is, expenditure above a ‘committed’
amount.
2.2 Multi-Period Contexts
Evaluations are also made in a multi-period context. Consider ﬁrst a single
individual where Ct represents consumption (or some other suitable metric)
in period t. An additive utility function deﬁned over T periods, where ρ is









Consider periods 1 and 2. The pure time preference, or impatience, rate
measures the extent to which the slope of an indiﬀerence curve, at a point
where C1 = C2, deviates from a downward sloping (from left to right) 45
degree line.6 It reﬂects impatience, or an ‘aversion to waiting’ on the part
of the individual, whereby faced with a constant consumption stream the
individual is prepared to give up more than one unit of C2 in order to obtain
o n em o r eu n i to fC1. For any combination of C1 and C2, the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption in the two periods, MRSc1,c2,i st h e
absolute value of the slope of the individual’s indiﬀerence curve, and is thus
∂UT/∂C1
∂UT/∂C2.
The discount rate, r, at any combination of C1 and C2,i sd e ﬁned as:
1+r = MRSc1,c2 (7)
6The terminology is not universally accepted. For example, Pearce and Ulph (1998),
refer to this simply as the ‘rate of time preference (the rate at which utility is discounted’,
and decompose it into a ‘pure rate’ and a term reﬂecting the rate of growth of life chances.














Figure 1: Time Preference







where εp is the absolute value of the individual’s elasticity of the marginal






(1 + ρ) (9)
An example is shown in Figure 1. At the point of intersection with the 45
degree line from the origin, along which consumption is equal in both periods,
the solid indiﬀerence curve shown is steeper than the downward sloping 45
d e g r e el i n e ,i n d i c a t i n gad e g r e eo fp u r et i m ep r e f e r e n c e . T h ec o n v e x i t yo f
the indiﬀerence curve is aﬀected by the value of εp, so that the solid curve
reﬂects a lower value than the broken curve. If εp =0 ,t h ei n d i ﬀerence
curves are straight lines and the individual’s optimal position would be a
7It is also the absolute value of the elasticity of the marginal rate of substitution with
respect to the ratio of consumption levels.
8corner solution, consuming everything either in period 1 or 2, depending on
whether the market rate of interest (assuming equal borrowing and lending
rates) is less than or greater than the pure time preference rate. In general the
individual’s optimal position is a tangency where the market rate of interest
equals the time preference rate.
A convenient expression for the discount rate can be obtained using an
approximation which holds when the various rates are small. Let g denote
the growth rate of consumption, so that C2
C1 =1+g and:
r =( 1+g)
εp (1 + ρ) − 1 (10)
Expanding (1 + g)
εp and neglecting squared and higher-order powers gives
(1 + g)
εp ≈ 1+εpg.8 Hence r =( 1+εpg)(1+ρ)−1, and making the further
assumption that εpgρ ≈ 0, the individual’s discount rate is:
r = ρ + εpg (11)
Hence the discount rate is equal to the pure time preference, or impatience,
rate plus the product of the growth rate of consumption and the individual’s
(absolute) elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. The growth rate
aﬀects the diﬀerence between consumption in the present and future, and εp
reﬂects an aversion to inequality between periods (not impatience to consume
in the present), and the combination of these involves an addition to pure
time preference.
The above applies to an individual person; hence the p subscript. How-
ever, there is a substantial literature which is based on the concept of a
‘representative individual’. In this case, optimal plans are unambiguously
based on the preferences of this representative individual. Typically, such an
individual is assumed to exist without consideration of aggregation require-
ments.9
8Writing (1 + g)
ε = α0 + α1g,s ot h a ts e t t i n gg =0 ,α 0 =1 .F u r t h e rd(1 + g)
ε /dg =
ε(1 + g)
ε−1 = α1, and setting g =0 , α1 = ε. Alternatively take logarithms of 1+r and
use, for each relevant term, the appoximation log(1 + y)=y.
9It is known that quasi-homothetic (Gorman) preferences are required for aggregates
to be interpreted as arising from the preferences of a representative individual. In this
case demands are linear, with a common slope, although intercepts may diﬀer to allow for,
say, demographic factors.
9In the absence of a representative individual, optimal plans may be re-
garded instead as being based on a social welfare function, whereby the Cs









In this case, W (Ct) represents the contribution of period t’s aggregate con-
sumption to the evaluation function, and ρm represents the pure time prefer-








In this context the discount rate is commonly referred to as the ‘social time
preference rate’, rm,a n di sg i v e n ,w h e r egm is the aggregate growth rate of
consumption, by:
rm = ρm + εmgm (14)
Estimates of εp have been obtained from studies of saving behaviour over
time, for a sample of individuals.10 However, in the general situation where
t h e r ea r em a n yi n d i v i d u a l sa n da ne v a l u a t i o ni sr e q u i r e di nt e r m so fas o c i a l
welfare function, the term εm represents the value judgements of a judge or
policy maker. Therefore, there is no reason to impose εm = εp;t h ef o r m e r
involves a value judgement and there is no logical connection between the
two rates.11
In thinking about the appropriate values for εm in this context, quite
diﬀerent considerations apply compared with the case of single-period distri-
butional judgements involving inequality aversion, εs, discussed earlier. The
term εm is, in the multi-period framework, more accurately interpreted in
10On the approach, with a review of alternative estimates, see Pearce and Ulph (1998).
11Marina and Scaramozzino (1999, p.6) provided an interesting analysis of growth in an
overlapping generations framework. They stated that, ‘a social rate of pure time preference
is justiﬁable on purely ethical grounds’. A clearer statement of what the authors showed
is that if the objective of maximising average steady-state consumption per capita is
adopted, then an implication of this ethical value judgement, combined with a model
containing productivity and population growth, is that positive time preference exists
that does not reﬂect myopia.
10terms of an aversion on the part of the judge towards variability — inequality
between periods rather than inequality between persons. Yet unfortunately
these terms are often conﬂated in the literature, where discussion proceeds
as if εm, εp and εs w e r et h es a m et h i n g .
3 Taxation and Equal Absolute Sacriﬁce
In using ε values to evaluate social welfare functions, or carry out cost-
beneﬁt evaluations, it is important to ensure that they are within a range
that is considered appropriate by a reasonable number of users of the results.
Hence questionnaire studies have been designed to elicit information about
individuals’ value judgements. Nevertheless, those conducting the surveys
do not suggest that they can produce any single value that should be used
in policy evaluations.12
Alternatively, several studies have attempted to estimate the implicit
value judgements revealed by tax and transfer policies, and have suggested
that they provide a guide to ε values which should be applied in policy evalu-
ations.13 These attempts, such as Stern (1977), Cowell and Gardiner (1999)
and Evans (2005), are examined in this section. The approach is based on the
principle of equal absolute sacriﬁce. It also takes the view that incomes are
exogenously given, rather than arising from labour supply behaviour (subject
to endowments and education which give rise to individual productivities).
12It was in this spirit that the questionnaire study of Amiel et al. (1999) was carried
out; there was no pretence that resulting values represent estimates which ‘should’ be used
in social evaluations. A substantial number of respondents did not adhere to the constant
relative inequality aversion form. In addition, Amiel and Cowell (1992, 1994) have found
that a large number of respondents do not actually share the value judgements that are
explicit in the most common forms of social welfare function used in evaluation work.
This presents a challenge to produce alternative ﬂexible speciﬁcations. Early questionnaire
studies were carried out by Glesjer et al. (1977), and Gevers et al. (1979), although no
attempt was made to estimate precise speciﬁcations of distributional preferences.
13Ad i ﬀerent view is that such estimates may be useful in checking whether there is in fact
any correspondence between policies and basic value judgements of policy makers. Given
the complexities involved in tax policy design, it may be useful to know if a particular
structure is associated with implicit judgements that may be very diﬀerent from those
actually held (though seldom made explicit). This view was expressed by van de Ven
and Creedy (2005) when examining adult equivalence scales implicit in tax and transfer
systems.
11It seems likely that the approach has been chosen largely for its simplicity.14
Suppose x represents ‘income’ and the tax function is T (x). Equal ab-
solute sacriﬁce requires, for all x, that the absolute diﬀerence between pre-tax
and post-tax utility is the same for all individuals. Hence:
U (x) − U (x − T (x)) = k (15)
where U (.) represents a utility function which is considered to be the same
for all individuals. The parameter k depends on the amount of revenue per
person. A standard assumption is that U takes the iso-elastic form discussed
above, whereby U (x)=x1−ετ/(1 − ετ) for ετ 6=1 . Young (1987) actually
showed that this form is required if an indexation requirement is imposed on
the tax structure in addition to equal sacriﬁce. But of course ﬁscal drag is a
common, indeed almost universal, feature of income tax structures.
The method is therefore to estimate the value of ετ, where it is simply
assumed that policies are actually based on a view by the ﬁctional policy-
maker that all utility functions take identical iso-elastic functional forms,
combined with equal absolute sacriﬁce as an objective.15 The combination of








Diﬀerentiation and simpliﬁcation gives, as in Evans (2005, p.207), the result
that:
log(1 − T







where T0 (x) and T (x)/x are marginal and average tax rates. Alterna-
tive approaches have been used given the expression in (17). It has been
used to carry out ordinary least squares regressions using tax functions,
14Those using the approach to ‘estimate’ ε have tended to ignore the objections raised
by Edgeworth and others concerning the various interpretations of sacriﬁce theories. This
does not apply to those, such as Richter (1983) and Young (1987) who were interested
only in deriving the implications of various axioms.
15As o m e w h a td i ﬀerent view would replace U (x) with W (x). Thus, as with inequality
measurement, a judgement is made regarding the welfare metric, and then a view is taken
about variations in x. This judgement is quite separate from the way individuals may
themselves view such variations.
12so that ετ and its standard error are obtained as a regression coeﬃcient.16
In practice there are also serious issues relating to the deﬁnition of x,b u t
these need not be considered here. Alternatively, (17) is rearranged to get
ετ =l o g ( 1−MTR)/log(1 − ATR), and diﬀerent ετ are obtained and com-
pared at diﬀerent income levels.
The ﬁrst point to stress regarding this approach is that it automatically
produces a value of ετ in excess of unity for a progressive tax system, for
which the marginal tax rate exceeds the average tax rate.17 T h ev a l u e so fετ
obtained in this way are thus severely constrained by the speciﬁcation of the
objective of equal absolute sacriﬁce.
It is thus important to ask whether it is sensible to model the tax structure
as if it arose from equal absolute sacriﬁce. Rather than simply estimating ετ,
using an untested assumption about objectives, consider the nature of the
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ª1/(1−ετ) (18)






1−ετ − k(1 − ετ)
ª ετ
1−ετ (19)
Hence the relevant question, before attempting to infer inequality aver-
sion, is to ask whether (18) is a reasonable approximation to actual tax
structures. The coeﬃcient k is determined by the amount of revenue raised
by the tax. Suppose that x follows a lognormal distribution with mean and
variance of logarithms of µ =1 0and σ2 =0 .5 respectively. These values
imply an arithmetic mean income of $28,282. Suppose it is required to raise
revenue per person of $10,000 and that ετ =1 .5. Using a numerical iterative
search procedure, it is found that this requires k =0 .0025.19 This gives the
16There is some diﬀerence of opinion over whether to include a constant in the regression.
Compare Cowell and Gardiner (1999) and Evans (2005), who also use diﬀerent income
measures.
17This was discussed by Edgeworth (1897) and formally shown by Samuelson (1947).
18In stating this result, Young (1987, p. 212) rewrote −k(1 − ε) as λ
1−ε,s ot h a tt h e
tax function campares with a constant elasticity of substitution form.






































Figure 2: Marginal and Average Tax Rates: Equal Absolute Sacriﬁce
schedules in Figure 2. Of course, in practice tax functions are multi-step
functions with ranges where the marginal rate is constant. In structures like
that in the UK, there is a ‘standard rate’ which applies over a wide range
of taxable income; the above function obviously has diﬃculty capturing this
range. But it is probably suﬃciently ﬂexible to give a reasonable approxi-
mation above the standard rate.
However, other ﬂexible tax functions can easily be produced with variants
of the basic model. The objective of equal absolute sacriﬁce may, for example,
be combined with a welfare function displaying constant absolute inequality
aversion, such that:
W =1− exp(−αx) (20)
This has constant absolute aversion of −(d2W (x)/dx2)/(dW (x)/dx)=









20Here the slopes of social indiﬀerence curves relating to any two individuals are constant
for a given absolute diﬀerence between incomes of the two people, contrasting with the
case of relative aversion where the slope is constant for a given ratio of incomes.
14The marginal tax rate is therefore:
dT (x)
dx
=1− (1 + ke
αx)
−1 (22)
This is quite ﬂexible and can be made to display rate schedules similar to
those above. Indeed, several other forms are candidates to approximate tax
schedules. Dalton (1954, pp.68-70) discussed several examples using alter-
native utility functions and sacriﬁce principles, and showed that if equal
absolute sacriﬁce produces progression, equal proportional sacriﬁce produces
a more progressive tax structure.21
Hence some scepticism must be attached to the usefulness of estimates
obtained on the basis of an arbitrary utility function and sacriﬁce principle.
Furthermore, any such estimates of ετ cannot be interpreted as providing
values which ‘should’ be used in any particular policy evaluation, that is,
where values of εm or εs are imposed. There is no alternative to simply
accepting that value judgements are required and the best attitude of pro-
fessional economists is to report a range of results based on alternative value
judgements, rather than suggesting that particular values can be attributed
to ‘society’ and duly estimated objectively.
All tax functions such as those considered in this section have in common,
since they are based on a form of sacriﬁce principle, the limitation that
they apply onto to positive taxes. They can thus relate at best to a small
component of a much broader set of taxes and transfers. The following section
discusses the optimal tax approach which allows for a transfer payment,
equivalent to a negative income tax.
4 Maximising a SWF
This section contrasts the minimum sacriﬁce approach with the standard
form of the optimal linear income tax problem, where it is required to select
the values of a social dividend, a, and constant marginal tax rate, t,i n
21In an early study, Preinreich (1948) considered the form of the utility schedule con-
sistent with the US tax legislation, without imposing a speciﬁc functional form over the
whole income range. He assumed equal proportional sacriﬁce.
15order to maximise a social welfare function W. In a pure transfer system
this must satisfy the government’s budget constraint that a = t¯ y,w h e r ey
is arithmetic mean earnings. At the same time each individual maximises
utility Uh = Uh(ch,  h) where c and   respectively denote consumption (net
income) and leisure, expressed as a proportion of total time available. If
the price of consumption is normalised to unity and the wage obtained by
person h is wh, each individual’s budget constraint is expressed as ch =
wh (1 − t)(1−  h)+a. In view of the government’s budget constraint, there
i so n l yo n ed e g r e eo ff r e e d o mi nt h ec h o i c eo ft a xp a r a m e t e r s .I ns p e c i f y i n g
the extent of heterogeneity in the model, it is usual to assume that there is
an exogenous distribution of wage rates, wh, but that all individuals have the
same tastes and face the same tax rates and commodity prices.
Typically the welfare function to be maximised is expressed in terms of
utilities, so that WU = W (U1,...,UH). However, results are not invariant
with respect to the cardinalisation used, so that an alternative is to use
a money metric welfare measure that is not subject to this limitation. In
general, where the direct utility function is written as U = U(x),w h e r ex is a
vector of consumption levels, and the indirect form is written as V = V (p,y),
where y is income (the budget) and p is a vector of prices, a money metric
utility measure, yE,i sd e ﬁned by:
V (pr,y E)=V (p,y) (23)
The expenditure function E(p,U), gives the minimum expenditure required
to achieve utility level U at prices, p. Money metric utility can therefore be
expressed as:
yE = E(pr,V(p,y)) (24)
and the social welfare function becomes WE = W (yE,1,...,YE,N).22
Comparisons can be made using simulation methods, based on the con-
stant inequality aversion welfare function discussed earlier. Suppose that
22In the standard two-good Cobb-Douglas case of consumption of x1,a n do fx2 of the
goods at given prices p1 and p2 respectively, U = xα
1x
1−α








16wage rates follow the lognormal distribution with variance of logarithms of
0.5. Furthermore, assume that α =0 .6. Assume that individuals’ utility






and all individuals have the same value of α.23 In computing an optimal
tax rate, the ﬁr s ts t e pi st os o l v ef o rt h et r a n s f e rp a y m e n t ,a, given values
of t,using the government’s budget constraint, a = ty, for a pure transfer
scheme. Since ¯ y depends on the transfer, a, this constraint must be solved
iteratively.24
A simulated population of 5000 individuals was generated in order to
calculate the optimum tax rates shown in Table 1.25 T h eo p t i m a lt a xr a t ei s
reported for variations in values of the relative inequality aversion parameter,
εo, using the two social welfare functions:

















For inﬁnitely large εo, the solution approaches the maxi-min, which max-
imises the welfare associated with the poorest person, so that in each case
the optimal marginal rate approaches the value that maximises the threshold,
a. This rate is found to be given by t =0 .64.









23The Cobb-Douglas case has a constant elasticity of substition between leisure and
consumption of unity, so the optimal linear tax rates are relatively high.
24The approach uses the result that ¯ y = α¯ wGξ (wL),w h e r ew is the arithemtic mean
wage rate. Further, Gξ (wL)={1 − F1 (wL)} − (ξ/α¯ w){1 − F (wL)}F(w) is the dis-
tribution function and F1(w) is the ﬁrst moment distribution; for details of these func-
tions, see Creedy (1996). For those who work, earnings are given by y = αw − ξ,w i t h
ξ = a(1 − α)/(1 − t).
25In each case, the value of t was varied in steps of 0.005, and a grid search was carried
out to ﬁnd t giving maximum social welfare.
17Table 1: Optimal Linear Tax Rates












The optimal rate is clearly more sensitive to εo when a money metric
utility measure is used in the welfare function, with the rates being equal
where εo =1 . It is equally clear from the table that the framework gives
relatively high tax rates even for low values of inequality aversion. Those
examining optimal tax models have not suggested that actual tax policies
are driven by such a framework, or that policies should be dictated by such
results. They are in the spirit of examining the implications of alternative
objectives. Not surprisingly, the optimal tax framework has not been used
as the basis of attempts to obtain implicit value judgements — indeed it
demonstates the considerable complexity involved in the link between value
judgements and the tax structure. It also clearly shows that the imposition
of a model, such as equal absolute sacriﬁc e ,t oe s t i m a t eav a l u eo fε that
is necessarily restricted to the range ε>1 is a rather artiﬁcial and highly
restrictive case.
5 Interpreting Orders of Magnitude
In examining the implications of alternative value judgements, using an iso-
elastic weighting function with diﬀerent values of ε,i ti so fc o u r s ei m p o r t a n t
to appreciate the precise nature of the comparisons being made. When the
18link between this type of social welfare function and a measure of inequality
was introduced by Atkinson (1970), he recognised the diﬃculty of forming





1−ε . In order to help interpretation, he used the idea of a ‘leaky
bucket’ experiment, which considers the extent to which a judge is prepared
to tolerate some loss in making a transfer from one person to another.26
Consider two individuals, so that from the welfare function, setting the












The welfare function is thus homothetic, as the slopes of social indiﬀerence
curves are the same along any ray drawn through the origin. Consider two
individuals and, using discrete changes, suppose a dollar is taken from the
richest, such that ∆y2 = −1. The amount to be given to the other individual







For example, if y2 =2 y1 and ε =1 .5, it is necessary to give person 1 only
35 cents — a leak of 65 cents from the original dollar taken from person 2 is
tolerated. If ε =1 , a leak of 50 cents is tolerated.
This type of experiment, and thus the sensitivity of the tolerance for a
leaking bucket, is well-known in the literature on inequality measurement.
But in other contexts in which the same kind of iso-elastic function is used,
relatively large values of ε are often adopted without, it seems, consideration
of such implications.27 For example, in the intertemporal literature, a value
of ε =2is often used. Supose that total income (or consumption) in the
ﬁrst period is 100 and this grows at a rate of 0.02 per period. In period 10
it is thus 119.5, and a judge with ε =2would be prepared to take a dollar
from period 10, and give only $0.70 to period 1. By period 20 total income
26Okun (1975) examined a slightly diﬀerent kind of leaky bucket experiment involving
transfers between groups of indivduals.
27However, it is discussed by Pearce and Ulph (1998, pp.280-281).
19would be 145.7, and the same judge would reduce period 20’s income by $1
while adding only $0.47 to the ﬁr s tp e r i o d .T h es o c i a lt i m ep r e f e r e n c er a t e
is thereby increased signiﬁcantly above the pure time preference rate.
The leaky bucket experiment therefore provides a useful illustration of
the implications, in terms of value judgements, of adopting particular values
of ε in any policy evaluation.
6 Conclusions
This paper has been concerned with the use of social welfare functions in
evaluating actual or potential changes resulting from policies or other factors
aﬀe c t i n gaw e l l - d e ﬁned group of individuals. In particular, it has considered
suggestions regarding the welfare weights to be used in comparing the gains
and losses of diﬀerent individuals (or other appropriate units of analysis),
and a social time preference rate for use in cost beneﬁt evaluation. While
these variables essentially reﬂect value judgements, some authors have argued
that they can be estimated either from consumers’ behaviour or from the
judgements implicit in tax policy. It was instead suggested here that results
are highly sensitive to the context and model speciﬁcation assumed.
More importantly, the argument that an estimated elasticity of marginal
utility or social time preference rate should be used in policy evaluations fails
to recognise that fundamental value judgements are involved. The various
estimates and models may be of interest, but they cannot be used by econo-
mists to impose value judgements. The main contribution economists can
make is to examine the implications of adopting a range of alternative value
judgements.
This argument is of course not new. Indeed it was stated most forcefully
and eloquently by Robbins (1935) in his important book on the Nature and
Signiﬁcance of Economic Science. He argued, ‘propositions involving the
verb “aught” are diﬀe r e n ti nk i n df r o mp r o p o s i t i o n si n v o l v i n gt h ev e r b“ i s ” .
And it is diﬃcult to see what possible good can be served by not keeping
them separate, or failing to recognise their essential diﬀerence’ (1935, p.149).
It seems worthwhile to repeat these warnings of Robbins, along with his view
20that:
All this is not to say that economist may not assume as pos-
tulates diﬀerent judgments of value, and then on the assumption
that these are valid enquire what judgment is to be passed upon
particular proposals for action. On the contrary, as we shall see,
it is just in the light that it casts upon the signiﬁcance and consis-
tency of diﬀerent ultimate valuations that the utility of economics
consists. (1935, p.149)
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